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ESTIMATING THE WELFARE EFFECTS
OF DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE
ABSTWCT
While much economic policy presumes that more information infrastructure yields higher
economic returns, little empirical work measures the magnitudes of these returns. We examine
investment by local exchange telephone companies in fiber optic cable, ISDN lines and signal seven
software, infrastructure which plays an essential role in bringing digital technology to local
telephone networks. We estimate the elmticity of the derived demand for infrastructure investment
faced by local exchange companies, controlling for factors such as local economic activity and the
political disposition of state regulators. Our model postulates a regulated profit maximizing local
exchange firm and a regulatory agency with predetermined political leanings in favor of consumer
prices or firm profits. The model accounts for variation in state regulation and local economic
conditions.
In all our estimates we find that consumer demand is sensitive to investment in modem
infrastructure, particularly as represented by fiber optic cable. Our estimates imply that
infrastructure investment is responsible for a substantial fraction of the recent growth in consumer
surplus and business revenue in local telecommunication services.
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I. Introdllction
Much recent policy discussion presumes that improvements in information infrastructure
lead to large economic returns. Despite the explosive growth in recent commentary about the
development and impact of digital infi-astructure, there have been few attempts to estimate the
magnitudes of the economic gains associated with improving information infrastructure.
This should not be a surprise. Some well known problems in the economics of
technology, infrastmcture and measurement make this estimation particularly difficult. First,
calculating the economic trade-off between old and new technologies or equipment requires
knowledge about the benefits associated with modem facilities relative to those arising from
existing ones. Yet, it is.difficult to measure levels of quality and quantity of infrastructure, let
alone differences between old and new. Second, although infrastructure improvements may
reduce the costs of providing new services and increme the quality of old services, the exact
benefits associated with these changes may be difficult to trace. Third, questions about economic
benefits require information about the demand for the incremental improvements associated with
modernization. Measuring demand for such change requires information about users’ valuation,
which are also hard to learn. Inferences from actual behavior require appropriate models and
extensive data collection. These are not easy to match to each other as the particularities of
institutions and markets influence both the availability of data and the appropriateness of the
models at hand. Finally, multiple information technology markets comprise the information
infrastructure, but at best, any study can only focus on a few markets at a time.
In this study we focus on one type of modem itiastructure, digital technology, in a
particularly important setting, local telephone service. We measure how investments in digital
technology influence the demand for -- and economic value of -- local telecommunications
services. Local telephone networks are a crucial part of the much-anticipated “information
super-highway.” The main providers of local telephone sewice in the United States generate
revenues in excess of seventy billion dollars in 1992 and they offer service to over ninety percent
of the US population. Yet, the benefits associated with modernizing these firm’s networks
remains sketchy.
More specifically, this study focuses on memuring the impact of modernizing Local~U?USI31. 1996 J}’ELF.4RE BE:VEFt~ FRO.if 1.VFR4STRCC~RE Page 2
Exchange Companies’ (LECS) telecommunications infrastructure at the sub-state level, which is
the most disaggregate level at which one can measure local phone company infrastmcture. At
this level of aggregation there is a statistical “natural experiment,” i.e., there is a large regional
variation in the quality of local telephone nenvorks across the United States, particularly in the
level of digital technology. Further, LECS also cover different geographic territory, face different
state regulatory environments, and operate under very different local economic conditions. Some
of these features vary widely across the US and a few vary widely over time. All this regional
variation provides an opportunity to relate regional variation in infrastructure quality to regional
variation in telephone demand and revenue, While this variation has been recognized for some
years as a source of many mini-experiments in telecommunications across the US, it has been
difficult to translate into a measurement framework. In this study we offer both a novel data
collection effort and a novel modeling framework for taking advantage of this variation.
Several key factors shape our econometric and measurement strategy. First, we need a
model of demand that is consistent with economic theory, flexible enough to lend itse~ to
estimation and related welfare inferences, but robust to a variety of specifications. Our’strategy is
to treat the demand for infrastmcture as a derived demand for the input of a regulated firm, where
that input influences the revenues a firm collects. Second, some part of investment behavior
responds to factors such as local economic activity and the political disposition of state ,
regulators. We need to control for these factors, so we collect very extensive data on the
economic and demographic factors that influence telephone demand. Third, we camot observe
prices, nor the regulated process that determines them, though we can proxy for both. Thus, our
goal is to estimate the elmticity of final user demand for infrastructure investment by their LEC,
but not employ a method that depends on any particular estimate of the price elasticity of
demand.
Our approach attempts to hold measurement problems to the lowest minimum possible,
since geographic variation in the quality of local telephone ne~orks should lead to related (and
localized) geographic variation in the quality and amount of local telephone revenue. This study
also differs from previous research in our econometrics treatment of these issues: we treat
modem infrastructure as endogenous, we estimate all effects within the structure of a.+ U: US[31. 1996 lbrELF.4REBE.YEFITS FRO.\[ 1.VFR4STRUCXRE Page 3
regulator/utility interaction model, and we offer an expanded list of “controls” (i.e., regressors)
for related economic behavior. Thus, our study advances novel approaches to issues pertinent to
the economics of information infrastructure, empirical models of regulation and the measurement
of benefits to users from technical change.
?Ve specifically examine investment in fiber optic cable, Integrated Services Digital
Network (ISDN) lines and signal seven software (SS7), infrastructure which plays an essential
role in bringing digital technology to LEC’s networks (more on the technology below). We
broadly interpret these as measures of a whole range of digital technology which are demand
enhancing. We find that fiber-optic cable greatly enhances LEC demand, but the contribution
from ISDN and SS7 is probably smaller as of 1992, when our data ends. The estimated elasticity
of consumer surplus to fiber optic deployment is never less than 7 percent and is much higher in
some estimates. The elasticity of consumer surplus for ISDN ranges between zero and 16
percent. The elasticity for SS7 is not robustly estimated.
We cannot say how much of the additional revenue brought about by these inwstments
were or were not captured by the LEC or consumers, but these estimates are consistent with large
social returns to investment in digital technology, especially those technologies related to fiber
optic cable. Our estimates also appear consistent with industry consensus that in the absence of
LEC investment in new technologies, revenues would have fallen in many localities. It is also
consistent with the view that LECS differed tremendously in the returns and installation costs
associated with these investments due to local economic conditions, and that these differences
have narrowed somewhat over time. We also find quantitative evidence that the political and
regulatory environment had a large role in shaping the differences in returns to new infrastructure
across localities.
II. The Economic Consequences from Modernizing Infrastructure
In this study, we ask whether variation in the degree of modernization across regions of
the US influences economic outcomes in those regions. What are the additional cost and benefits
of upgrading from a merely fictional system to a state-of-the-art digital system capable of
carrying many additional services? mere has been surprisingly little reseach done on this~UgUSt ~ ]. 1996 JI’ELF.4REBE.VEFI~ FRO.b(l.VFR4STR UCTb-RE Page 4
question, though related issues in telecommunications and infrastructure have received
considerable attention outside the US context. “z
Our approach to this question is in the spirit of a line of new research primarily on
information technology -- and new goods more generally (Bresnahan and Gordon [1996]).;This
research tries to measure the benefits to users from improvements in technology by estimating
the underlying (derived) demand for the new technology or the new sewice it enables. This
literature places emphasis on modeling heterogeneous consumer demand for technical
improvement. It tries to link estimation and inferences to the underlying utility msociated with
new technology, though no standard technique has yet emerged for making such estimates.
Our goals also relate to an extensive literature on the economic consequences of
infrastructure investment in modem market economies, where infrastmcture is broadly defined as
highways, water and sewer systems, schools, hospitals, electrical and transportation facilities,
and other publicly owned equipment and structures.’ We will not review all these studies here,
and instead, will focus only on recent studies of the modernization of telecommunications
networks in developed economies, a topic relates most closely to our focus. These studies find
that a large fraction of economic growth maybe attributable to increases in the efficiency of
telecommunications infrastmcture.5These studies also argue that some part of regional variation
in economic activity may be attributed to the quality of regional telecommunications
infrastmcture.6
We are sensitive to many of the methodological concerns raised in these studies. We
adopt a framework that has elements of change embedded in it, albeit in a simple structural
model. Second, our econometrics framework controls for statistical endogeneity. Third, we
very disaggregate analysis, below the state level, but contrast infimtructure across many
different regions, taking advantage of the statistical variation embedded in cross-regional
differences in telecommunications network quality. Fourth, unlike previous studies, our
use a
estimation begins to account for some of the institutional features of telecommunications politics
and regulatory environment. Fifth, we use a structural model to link our estimates directly back
to parameters of direct economic interest, the benefits to buyers from technical change.~U:US[ 31.1996 JKELF.J RE BE,VEF~ FRO.11I.VFMSTRUCTURE Page 5
III. Model and Econometrics
We undertake our analysis at the level of the local exchange company at the sub-state
level. This is the most disaggregate level of data available on local telephone infrastructure. This
also takes advantage of the peculiw federalism of local telephone service within the US.
Furthermore, every state divides its territory be~een a regional bell operating company and
potentially other local telephone companies, such as GTE or other independents. Thus, two
different LECS may face different regional demand and regulatory restrictions even if they are
within the same state or within proximate geographic regions.
We observe some of the differences in the quality and quantity of infrastructure between
LECS and match it to LEC specific revenue. We also observe some of the variation in local
demographic and economic conditions (at the LEC level), as well as some of the differences in
state regulatory environments between states. However, we are not able to obseme the multiple
tariffs that prevail within each LEC for calls of different distance at different times of the day,
nor the various toll prices for within-state calls. Thus, to make use of LEC-specific data on
revenue and infrastmcture, we require a method for estimating an infrastmcture elasticity that
should not depend on observing prices at all.
1. Modei of demand.
We derive a model to guide our estimation, both in terms of selecting appropriate
regressors and of interpreting the coefficients of the final system. Our model has the following
actors: A regulator and a profit maximizing LEC that invests in a single infrastructure variable,
fiber, with a single product (local telephone semice) and price (which, as mentioned, we will not
observe). The regulatory agency has predetermined political leanings in favor of consumers or
firms. The model, then, accommodates variation in local economic and regulatory conditions.
The key assumptions in the model concern the relationship between itiastructure and final .
demand, We assume that infrastructure rotates outward the demand for telecommunications as it
leads to the provision of new services. Increases in infi-astructure have the feature of making the
demand for telecommunications more elastic. Although this assumption makes intuitive sense
for the technologies we study,’ it is nevertheless a strong parametric assumption.*August 31.1996 }VELF.4REBE.VEF~ FRO.L[l.VF&STRUCT~RE Page 6
In particular if we let Q represent quantity demanded then
(1)
where X represents a vector of location specific demographic and economic variables, I
represents the installed level of fiber and P represents the price of final senice. Consumer
surplus is given by
P P
CS(PX,J = /Q(lX,P) dp = fl~ /g(~,P)~P
o 0
The effect on consumer welfare from infrastructure deployment is represented as either:
g= CS(PX,12) - cs(Px,l,) Al,) - Xl,) —
es c~(~x>~~) X1,) ,
where 1, and Izmeasure yesterday’s and today’s level of infrastructure deployment, or as
= EQJ
The first formulation measures the change in consumer surplus attributable to
infrastmcture deployment as a percent of the end period’s level, holding constant prices .9The
second measures the elasticity of consumer surplus with respect to infrastructure, also holding
constant prices. Under our parametric assumptions, the elasticity of consumer surplus with
respect to infrastructure deployment is the same as the elmticity of demand with respect to
infrastructure.
Similarly, the historical effect on revenues from itiastructure deployment maybe
represented as:~U:U513 1.1996 lVELF.4REBE.}’EFI~ FRO.\f [.VF&4STRtiCXRE Page 7
AR p X1*) g(~,p) - p X1,) g(~,p) _ Acs —=
R p fl~~) g(~,p) es
That is, the percentage change in revenue attributable to ifiastructure deployment
relative to final period’s revenue is the same as the percentage change in consumer surplus.’0
Similarly, the marginal revenue associated with another unit of infrastructure is




which provides one measure of the differences in returns to investment faced by different firms
Under any specification, the key parameters are f(I) and e~I. The goal of our model
use standard behavioral assumptions for firms and regulators to derive a minimal set of
parametric restrictions for estimating f(I).
2. Equilibrium interpretation.
is to
We assume that the regulator and the company play a Nash game. The regulator chooses
price, while the company chooses the level of infraswcture. Each player chooses its optimal
strategy holding constant the strategy of the other. In equilibrium, each is a best response to the
other. We msurne that the regulator maimizes a weighted average of consumer and producer
surplus (current cash flow), while the firm maximizes the present value of the profit stream
associated with investment. For pedagogical convenience, we also assume that digital
infrastructure only enhances demand and does not change operating costs. This is plausible since
most modernizing infrastructure investment has negligible influence on the marginal costs of
providing telephone service, but does involve substantial installation expenses.’ 1
Regulators choose prices to reflect the political disposition of the state and the locality.
~eir utility is given by:.+ USUS[ 31. ] 996 J}’ELF.4RE BE.VEFm FRO.\f 1.VFR4STRUCTURE Page 8
UR(X,P,I) = e cs(x,P,~ + n(x,P,~ (2)
where 0 must be greater than zero (in our model’s equilibrium it will be greater than 1), and
where H reflects the firm’s cash flow, and is given by:
H(x,P,~ ‘ P fl~ g(x,P) - W(I-lO) (3)
where 10is the initial infrastructure level and W is the unit economic cost of infrastructure. ‘z
M=imizing the regulator’s utility (i.e., the regulator sets prices) yields:




Regulatory optimization - as in (4) - implies that the equilibrium price -P* - is a @ction
of 0 and X. The intuition is that regulators choose a price to achieve a desired elasticity of
demand (in line with political demands as represented by 6).]; Finally, substituting in (4) revenue
for price (P=R/f(I)g(X,P)) we obtain
R = - flfl(e - 1) ‘(X’P)2
gp(x,p)
(4a)
From (4a), then, we obtain that revenue is a function of I, 0,X and P. But from (4), P is a
function only of X and 0, making R also a function only of I, 0 and X. Equation (4a) implies also
that the Nash equilibrium assumption is not necessary to estimate the revenue equation (4a).
Thus, the estimation of (4a) is robust to any type of investment model assumed.14 That is, the
estimation of (4a) can be done simply by (non-linear) two stage least squares, instrumenting for P
and I. As we explain below, most of our estimates are simply various specifications for (4a).
Thus, most of our analysis only requires implementing two stage least squares methods.~UZUSI 31.1996 JI’ELF.4 RE BE.\’EFm FRO.111.VFR4STRCCTURE Pa2e 9
3. Regulation, prices, andpo[itical constraints.
Prices, regulations, and political constraints vary across states. We modi& the generic
model in equation (4a) to account for such heterogeneity. Following quantitative models of
telecommunications regulation, we make two assumptions (see, for example, Smart [1995]).
First, regulators set prices based on 6 and XL, where the latter represents a vector of economic
and demographic factors at the level of the LEC. Second, the bias towards customers, 0, arises
from a complex political process, taking place partially at the state level and partially at the LEC
level. We measure several factors influencing this process. We label them economic and
demographic variables at the LEC level, XL, economic and demographic vmiables at the State,
Xs, and other (partially observable) political variables at the state, S. That is,
Thus, substituting (5) into (4a), we can rewrite (4a) to obtain
log (R*) = log fl~ + J(XSJL,S)
(5)
4. Functional Form
If we let f(.) be Cobb-Dougl=, then
log ~~) = y log (~
implying that the elasticity of consumer surplus with respect to infrastructure, e~I, is given by y.
If we let f(.) be translog then
log tin) = y, log (n + Y*[log -(D]*
implying that e~[ varies for different levels of I. ~~, is then given by y, + 2yz log (I).
With the Cobb-Douglas assumption the revenue equation (4b) becomes:
log (R*) = ylog (z) + J(xLJ~,s) (4C)
With the translog resumption the revenue equation becomes:~U:USl 31.1996 JVELF.4REB&.VEFm FRO.\f /.VFfiSTRLCTtiRE Page IO
log (R*) = yllog (~ + y2(log (~)z + J(XLJ~>S)
5. Econometric considerations.
We first propose to estimate our model using a two stage least square estimation of (4c),
which allows us to obtain the returns to infras~cture deployment without imposing cross
equation restrictions arising from a particular investment model. We start by specifying J(X~, X~,
S)= 5’X~ + 6zX~+ 5;S + ~. Thus, we estimate the Cobb-Douglas specification as
log (R*) = ylog (~ + 61XL + b2X~ + 63S + El (4d)
In equation (4d) XL, X~ , arid S are exogenous, while R and I are endogenous. We instrument for
I with w, where w is a vector of exogenous LEC-specific infrastructure installation cost factors.
y is the object of interest and is econometrically identified in the above. A similar and obvious
argument holds for the translog specification for f, where two coefficients for y will be
estimated.
Some related observations: First, estimating (4d) requires that prices not be a function of
infrastructure, as we have assumed all along .15Second, price elasticities are not identifiable from
(4d), because X, plays a role in the determination of 6 and in the determination of final
demand.]b Third, the constants in XL,X~ and S or W are not identified. Fourth, the argument
leading to (4d) suggests that the list of control variables in XL, X~ , and S should be extensive,
trying to capture factors influencing regional variation in telephone demand in the absence of
digital itiastructure. Further, the factors measuring our basic demographic instruments must be
exogenous to both the determination of R and I. Fifth, the Cobb-Douglas function assumes that
all LECS face the same infrmtructure elasticity. This assumption is virtually a necessity for this
study, since the data are not sufficiently rich to allow the estimation of LEC specific
infrastructure elasticities. Sixth, there is no econometric guarantee that the estimate for y will be
positive, though there is a presumption in the model that it is positive. ” Thus, a natural test for
the infrastructure fiction is whether the estimated coefficient differs horn zero. Seventh, the~U~USl 31.1996 }I”ELF.4 RE BE,VEFm FRO.LIlaYF&STRCCXRE Pa:e I 1
above specification presumes positive Is, as we use the expression log(I). 1sFinally, under the
usual data limitations we cannot argue that we filly measure all infrastructure investment, and
that our estimates imply that investment in fiber-optic cable by itself leads to some percent
increase in revenues at all LECS. We can argue, however, that investment in fiber, which is one
necessary part of digital infrastmcture, positively correlates with investments in a whole range of
digital technologies which are revenue enhancing. This precaution informs the interpretation
below.
6. Investment bejzavior
To explore some of the features of investment we solve for the profit maximizing level of
infrastmcture under the assumption that the features of the environment which influence LEC
investment do not change. This is the most natural model (of the many possible) for illustrating
the determinants of cost. This is sufficient for our purposes since we do not use this investment
model for any welfare inferences. r
At time t, firms maximize the net present value of profits given by
(6) .
where b is the firm’s discount rate and W are LEC-specific factors that influence the cost of
installing infrastructure. Assuming stationarity of X and (3over time, and that W is known, then
by (4) P is then stationary, and we can solve (6) to obtain an optimal I at time t.’g
The firm’s first order condition with respect to I is then given by
where A is a term including discount rates and other factors. By substituting
and performing other manipulations, equation (7) can be remanged to yield
(7)
revenue for price,~U~USt ~ 1, 1996 JVELF.4REBE.YEFITS FRO.\f ;.\-FMSTRCCTCRE Page 12
(7a)
From (7a), the equilibrium level of infiastmcture, I*, is a function of W, ~~,, X, and P and
discount factors. Assuming a Nash equilibrium, then, I = I* and P = P*. By equation (4), P* may
be solved independently of the value of I*, while I* must account for P* by equation (7). Hence,
assuming a unique solution from combining (4) and (7) and solving for I* and P*, I* becomes an
implicit functions of ~~,, W, (3and X, while P* is an implicit function only of only (3and X,
Although this model may be too simple to describe actual regulator/firm interactions, it
is useful for estimating some of the bmic determinants of installation costs. It also highlights
identification issues in our econometrics estimation. If we wish to estimate (4d) simultaneously
with an investment equation, then by (7a) it follows that we must estimate an investment
equation of the form
log (I*) = log (R*) + log (y) – log (W) + constant (7b)
where the above has assumed a Cobb-Douglas specification for f~). Letting W = aw + ~, we use
non-linear three stage least squares to estimate (4d) and
log (I*) = log (R*) + log (y) – ~W + constant + E2 (7C)
If we estimate a WO equation system consisting of (4d) and (7c), we not only improve the
efficiency of our estimate of y, but also, given the functional form and investment model
~surnptions, estimate the distribution of costs across firms, and their evolution. These additional
benefits, though, come at a price because of the limited flexibility of equation (7c).
7. E.rtensions to multip[e inpufi.
Since many infrmtructure technologies are complement~, it is important to measure
infrastmcture investment in several technologies simultaneously. Assume that NO types of
infrastmcture, 1, and Iz, influence demand. Let Q=f(I, ,Iz)g(X,P) and Wi = Cost of installing a~U:USI31. 1996 JVELF.4REBE.VEF~ FRO.111.YFR45TRCCXRE Page 13
unitof Ii, I= 1,2. T’henthe investment decision has two first order equations,
(7)
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas formulation for f(.), and after performing various substitutions we
obtain the system of equations which easily generalizes to more than two infrastmcture variables:
log (R*) = yllog (Ilj + yzlog (lz”) + 61X~ + 62X~ + 53s + ~1 (4e)
log (~,”) = log (R*) + log (y) – awi + COnStUnt + E2, i=1,2 (7d)




Our estimates will provide a measure of the impact of infrastructure deployment on
consumer welfare. There are two key identification conditions. First, the determination of price,
by whatever political and regulatory process, must occur independently of the level of
infrastructure -- though the investment in infiastmcture may be a function of price level. Second,
telephone demand must be multiplicative in (almost) any function of infrastructure in order to
lead to closed, simple and ultimately measurable relationships between revenue levels and
infrastructure levels. These observations are useful for choosing instruments.
9. Specl~cation.
We estimate three specifications of the basic system. Our basic specification for (4d), and
(7c) when applicable, will assume a Cobb-Douglm benefit function and use the following
variables:
XL= {constant, log total LEC population, fraction LEC urbanized, fraction rural, log LEC perAugust 31.1996 lVELF.4REBE.VEFfX FRO.\l 1.VFR4~R tiCTCRE Page 14
capita income, year dummies, small LEC (state employment in this LEC less than 10
percent), log population density, city of half million, city of quarter of million, fast
growing area}.
X~ = {constant, state GNP growth, log state/local per capita income, fraction of state
employment in finance, insurance, and real estate}.
S = {constant, non-elected regulator, democrat majority of regulators, interaction of not-elected
and democrat majority, vote for Dukakis in 1988, governor democrat, legislature
democratic, legislature republican, governor and regulator from same party, governor and
regulator and legislature from same party}.
w = {constant, log of LEC construction wages, log of LEC level of construction employment,
LEC growth in level of employment in construction, year dummies, holding company
dummies, log of stock of fiber in 1986, translog in population and land }.
In our second specification of the Cobb-Douglas benefit finction we include qine holding
company dummies in XL. These dummies stand in for holding company specific differences in
the growth of revenues, In our third specification we use the same covariates as listed above
(without the holding company dummies), and estimate a translog. We only do this for fiber-optic
cable, where the larger sample size describing firms’s deployment of fiber yields sufficient
degrees of freedom. For reasons explained below, each specification will be estimated on two
different measures of revenue. One measures only local telephone revenue within the LEC. The
other includes access charges horn long distance telephone calls, which forms a significant
fraction of many LEC’S revenues. ~is results in six specifications for the estimation using only
fiber optic cable and four specifications for the estimation using fiber, ISDN and SS7 together.
We employ this number of specifications in order to explore the robustness of the inferences to
different specifications.
IV. Data
We undertake our analysis at the local exchange company at the sub-state level. Every
RBOC has a state company and many states divide its telephone franchise territory between one.~U:US[ ~ i. 1996 JI”ELF.4RE BE.VEFm FRO.LII,}’FR4STRtiC~RE Page 15
of the RBOCS and other national and local companies. We use three main sources of information
to understand these firms. For local-exchange company specific information&d data on
infrmtmcture we use an augmented version of the data developed by Greenstein, McMaster and
Spiller [1995] (GMS) and Greenstein and Spiller [1995]. For data on political and regulatory
v~ables we use the Book of the State published by the Council of State Governments, and we
use the Yearbooks of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.
GMS gathered demographic characteristics for each of the LEC’S territories in each state
for the period since divestiture. Because demographic information is available until 1992, and
most of the relevant digital infrastmcture data start to be reported in 1986, the GMS data set
covers the period 1986-1992. GIMSalso gathered infrastructure statistics for all those LECS that
file annually with the FCC. They file using forms M and ARMIS 43-03,43-04 and 43-07
(Alaska, and Hawaii were excluded). There are 101 local exchange carriers in each year of the
GMS data,z’ which results in a data set with a m~yimum of 707 observations. The demographic
information was collected at the county level, and was then assigned to the dominant parrier
within its boundaries according to maps showing the local exchange carriers’ territories in each
state.p The county data are then aggregated to the company level within each state.2; The main
source of the demographic (county level) data is the Annual Estimates of tie US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, “Regional Economic Information Systems
tiual CD,” and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment and Earning Annual Reports.
1. Infraslructlire.
We construct our sample from the largest local exchange companies (LECS) within the
United States at the sub-state level.z’ Data on miles of fiber optic cable covers 1986 until 1992
and is available for all companies -- RBOC, GTE, Contel, and many independents.z5 Data on
number of ISDN Iines,zb and SS7 switches covers 1988 until 1992 and is ordy available for the
RBOCS, GTE, Contel and very few independents.z7 As described in the three previous footnotes,
each of our infrastmcture variables measures increasing digitalization of a modem telephone
network.
All three of these infrastructure variables grew rapidly over our sample period (ifAugust 31.1996 lVELF.4REBE.VEFITSFRO.111.VFR4STRCC~RE Page 16
somewhat unevenly across companies and across time) and continues to grow today. For
example, the median number of fiber miles for all 101 LECS in 1992 was 22,371. Most LECS
increased the number of miles of fiber in their networks, with many smaller LECS starting from
very low levels in the mid 1980s. The median multiple increase was four times from its level
from 19S8. me total number of fiber miles (this includes both “lit” and “dark” fiber) at the 101
LECS was 6,385,578 in 1992.
2. Revenl[e.
We supplement these data with information on LEC revenues, as reported to the FCC.
This data are also collected as far back as 1986, but contain irreconcilable changes in definitions
between 1987 and 1988.28 ~is is the most binding constraint on our sample. It begins with 1988
and ends in 1992. Many small independent LECS do not report revenue at all and a few do not do
so until the later years in our sample.z9
As a measure of a LEC’S revenue we collected net operating revenue (“category 550” in
the FCC reports), which contains both revenue for local calls and access charges. We also
collected revenue for basic local service (“category 520” in the FCC reports), which contains no
access charges but does contain several other miscellaneous categories of revenue. The first
category of revenue more closely fits our model of LEC revenue. However, access charges form
a significant fraction of LEC revenue and have recently been changing as they come under
greater regulatory scrutiny and competitive pressure. We test the sensitivity of our results to the
definition of revenue.
For each specification we will report ~o different estimates, one using all revenue and
one using only local revenue. Among the balanced panel, casual inspection shows some variation
in revenue from one year to the next, but on average very little change in inflation adjusted levels
of revenue at most LECS over the five years. About half the sample saw an increme while the
other half saw a decrease -- usually this was not more than 5-10 percent in either direction, but a
few LECS did experience as much as 20% change in revenue.
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Local and state demographic and economic variables come from the BEA reports for
economic activity at the county level. We matched these reports against LEC territory maps, as
explained in GIMS [1995]. This provides data on total population, their composition, wages,
employment and other economic activity at the LEC level.
For the instruments in the two-stage least square estimates and for our marginal cost
equations we use different features of construction markets -- their size, level of wages and recent
growth. The memure of size controls for scale, construction wages controls for construction
costs, and construction employment growth controls for capacity constraints or downturns that
either raise or lower expenses. We include time dummies to reflect widely reported declines in
the costs of inputs and installation, particularly among fiber and ISDN. We include holding
company dummies to reflect differences in the ability of firms to install digital equipment. We
exclude the independent company dummies in the full sample and Contel and the independent
dummies in the partial sample. We include multiplicative specifications of costs in land and
population, reflecting both economies and diseconomies in network configuration. Th,ese scale
economies and diseconomies are associated with population size and geographic scope of sewice
territory. We also estimate an equation with inherited fiber in 1986; this stands in for inherited
costs advantages in installing digital equipment.
For our revenue equation, we include total population and some of its features from BEA
estimates. The US census distinguishes between urbanized, suburban and rural population.
Suburban population lives in cities between five and fifty thousand total population. We include
the fraction of the population of each type and exclude the fraction suburban. From BEA data we
include local per capita income, state per capita income, population density, state growth, and the
fraction of the state economy devoted to FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate). All these
measure the propensity of population and regional economy to use more telephone services and
political pressure to increase or decrease prices, We also include a dummy for whether a LEC is
very small (covers less than 10 percent of the state’s employment); we expect these small LECS
to be predominantly rural and protected by the regulatory process with higher prices or higher
access charges. We include time dummies, omitting the initial year.
We also add a dummy for whether the LEC contains a city within its boundaries with aAugust 31.1996 IVELF.4REBEiVEFf7S FRO.L[I,YFR4STRUCTLrRE Page 18
population over half a million, according to the 1990 US Census.;o While these areas are
geographically minute relative to a typical LEC geographic territory, they play a central role in
many regional economies, drawing population from surrounding territory daily for work, serving
as the hub and coordinator of much outlying economic activity in the periphery. We also use a
dummy for whether the LEC contains a city over a quarter million. Finally, we add a dummy for
whether the LEC covers an area designated as one of the fifty fastest growing SMSAS in the US
in the 1980s, again from the US census.~l
4. Po[iticai variables.
For every year we collected the political Wlliation of all state regulators in the state
agency in charge of telecommunications, if known; othewise we report the political party of the
governor that appointed the regulator. The source is the Yearbooks of the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. We used the Book of the States (VOL 25-29), Tables 2.1
and 3.2, for counts for the political affiliation of every legislator in the house and sen~te, as well
as the governor. We dropped Nebraska and Washington DC from the sample because neither
contains a bicameral legislature .32We include dummies for whether democrats are a majority in
tie state regulatory agency or not.;3 We also include dummies for whether the regulators are
elected on not (appointed = 1), as positive political theory predicts that the method of
appointment should influence telecommunications regulatory behavior (See e.g., Smart [1995]).
We also interact regulatory majority with election/appointment.
We further include the fraction of the popular vote for Dukakis in 1988 as a measure of
the political leanings of the state. Further, we include three dummies for the political affiliation
of the governor (Democrat = 1) and also for the legislature when both houses are from the same
party. The omitted category is any non-aligned legislature. Finally, we include NO dummies for
political alignment, which may influence the ease with which political institutions make changes
and commitment to regulatory policy and indirectly determine a firm’s revenue (see Sm~
[1995], and Levy and Spiller [1994]). One dummy takes on the value of one when the regulatory
agency and the governor me from the same party, the other takes on the value of one when the
regulatory agency, the governor and the legislature are from the same party.;~~U:U5[31. 1996 J1’ELF.4RE BE.VEFm FRO.\f I,VFR4STRCCTL’RE Page 19
5. Final data set.
Afier applying the selection criteria described above, the full sample (containing
information only about fiber) has 458 observations for 1988-1992. The partial sample
(containing information about fiber, ISDN and SS7) has 308 observations for 1989-1992. Both
are unbalanced panels, with complete obsemations for the RBOCS and GTE, and many
incomplete observations for other independents. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all
endogenous and exogenous variables, putting the instruments in the same category as local
demographic variables. We also report the infrastmcture variables for the partial sample. Since
there were no significant differences between the descriptive statistics for the exogenous
variables for the full and partial sample (except in the firm dummies, as noted), we only report
the results for the full sample.
X Estimation and results r
Since the two and three stage estimates of the revenue equation are not that different, we
focus on the two stage least square estimates for most of the discussion and present the three
stage least square results at the end to discuss the cost side. The larger sample (N=458) is used
for the model using only fiber. The smaller sample (N=308) estimates the model using fiber,
ISDN and SS7. Since we estimate the model on these unbalanced panels we interpret the
estimates accordingly, We view each year’s cross section of data as providing independent
observations on the same underlying relationship. Each Table presents four sets of estimates, WO
different specifications of revenue equation for two different revenue variables. Thus, all of our
conclusions about welfare results from itirastructure are supported by either set of the revenue
equation estimates. Only the conclusions about cost indexes require the cost equations in the
three stage estimates.
1. Revenue equation estimates
In Table 2 the infrastructure coefficient (only on fiber), which we interpret as the
elasticity of demand with respect to fiber, is significant and large. The estimates range from 0.06~U:US[31. 1996 JVELF.4 RE BE.VEF~ FRO.\f 1.YFR4STRtiCTURE Page 20
to 0.11. The coefficients on fiber are always positive and significant. The first two columns of
Table 1 in the appendix presents translog estimates for the basic specification and we summarize
the results in the bottom of Table 4.;5 The range of the estimates do not differ much horn their
values in Table 2, where the elasticities were assumed constant across all specifications. Hence,
we conclude that the translog specification for fiber adds little additional information in this
specification.
We now ~ to the multiple infrastmcture estimates, found in Table 3 and summarized in
Table 4. Table 3 contains even higher estimates for elasticity for fiber than in Table 2, ranging
from 0.08 to 0.18. The coefficients on ISDN are always positive and only significant when we
include the holding company dummies. Their low value is zero and their high is 0.16 in column
3 of table 3. The coefficients on SS7 are always negative except in column 4. This may indicate
that investment in SS7 is too positively collinear with investment in ISDN and fiber to be
informative. These results may also indicate that the bulk of the diffision of SS7 and ISDN takes
place too late in our data to have much effect on revenue. Updating this to more recent years
could yield quite different estimates, if recent publicity is to be believed. Further explorations
with translog specifications did not yield any additional insight and are not shown.;b In the
discussion below we explore the implications of the magnitude of these estimates and their
interpretation. A consemative conclusion so fti is that fiber infrastructure contributes to
enhancing demand, but that the others, by themselves, do not do so at all or not greatly.
We now discuss the estimates of the coefficients on the controls, which do not largely
differ between Tables 2 and 3. The control variables help predict revenue, largely in the predicted
direction. We first briefly review local demographics. Total population does increase revenues,
but at an elasticity less than one. Higher fractions of urbanized and rural populations do lead to
higher revenues (relative to suburban populations), but the coefficient magnitudes are usually
higher for the rural arem in most estimates; in other words, trading a set fraction of urbanized for
rural population, holding constant population size, increases revenue. However, trading either
one for a moderately small town will decrease revenue significantly. Small territories have higher
revenue, probably reflecting higher prices going to small rural areas. Population density is never
significant. The time dummies and sometimes the city hubs dummies (city with one quarter~U:USl31. 1996 IFELF.4REBE.YEF1~ FRO.\[ 1.VFR45TRCCTURE Page 21
million) generally have the expected signs and are ofien significmt. me time dummies indicate
a secular decline in revenue over time in the absence of other changes, though they vary widely
in their rates from one set of estimates to another. It is also difficult to make any robust
inferences from the LEC dummies in the revenue equation.
Of the state demographics, the log of state to local per capita income keeps its sign and
significance, though it varies in range. It says that the LEC benefits most when its per capita
income is much higher than the state average, and benefits least when the LEC is much lower
than the state average. When they are roughly the same, as when one LEC dominates most
territory within a state, then there is little effect. This coefficient perhaps indicates that the LEC
with much higher per capita income for the state contains concentrations of high-income
generating economic activity for the state, such as would be found in the major city within a
state. The coefficient on finance, insurance and real-estate activity (FIRE) also tends to be
positive and significant in most specifications, as expected. The difference between being in the
high and low FIRE state can have a large influence on LEC revenue.;’ State GNP gro~h does
not matter.
The coefficients on political variables contain several interesting estimates. First,
revenues are lowest when elected republicans are in charge of the regulatory commission, when
revenues may be lowered by as much as 30% or more. In all other situations (including
appointed republicans), the commission has roughly the same effect on revenues. Revenues are
also lower in states with high votes for Dukakis, but the magnitude of the effect is not too large
except between the extremes. Beween the extremes revenues carI vary as much as 40°i0(from
0.34 to 0.56, Utah and Massachusetts, respectively). None of the remaining political variables are
statistically significant in Table 2 and 3, though we note hints of several intriguing pattems.;s
Summarizing the state political variables, it seems that the regulatory agency and the political
leanings of the state have the largest effect on revenue, but the political affiliation of the different .
state actors also plays a role in some circumstances. We have more to say in the analysis below,
but we conclude tentatively that the political variables are important control variables to include
in the specification.August 31.1996 J}’ELF.4RE BE.VEFnS FRO.LIL\’FRAgRUCXRE Page 22
2. Calculating buyer and seller benefits from infrastructure investment
We now use our coefficient estimates to calculate the benefits to producers from actual
infimtructure investment. We calculate the change in a period’s demand attributable to (actual)
infimtructure relative to some bme demand year. We calculate this for every LEC in our sample
and then present summaries of these calculations. This calculation assumes that prices do not
change (e.g., because regulators compel it), which makes these estimates too optimistic if post-
investment prices fall or too pessimistic if they rise (from the LEC’s perspective) .39As noted in
the earlier section, this is not a true profit calculation, since we are not accounting for costs of
infras~cture deployment, nor are we accounting for anticipated changes in prices (i.e.,
anticipated by the firm) in response to infrastmcture deployment.
We also noted above that we may use the same measure to calculate the benefits to
consumers from actual infras~cture investment. This same measure provides the change in
consumer surplus attributable to infimticture deployment relative to a base year. For consumers
this calculation is too pessimistic if post-investment prices actually fall or too optimistic if they
actually rise.
Table 5 presents estimates of the welfare benefits from infrastmcture investment, using
the estimates from Table 2 and Table 3. These are consewative estimates, using the low
estimates from each table. In each case, we show the estimates we use. Since we have data on
fiber investment for all 101 LECS who report to the FCC, we use the whole sample (which is
slightly larger than the sample used for estimation of the coefficients).do This table compares
1992 with 1988. The next set of calculations uses a midrange estimate for fiber and a low
estimate for ISDN. We exclude SS7 since it is rarely significantly different from zero. We have
less data on ISDN for the 101 LECS. We are only able to make these calculations over 82 LECS
(which is also slightly ltiger than the sample used for estimation).” These two sets of
calculations compare 1992 with 1989.
In all the simulations in Table 5, the percent demand due to infrastructure investment is
substantial. Table 5’s estimates show 10 percent of LEC demand on average was due to
investment in fiber. The median percent was 9 percent, indicating little skewness in the benefits
across LECS. In the simulations using two infrastructure estimates, the estimates of the gain from~U:US[ ~ 1.1996 IVELFAREBE,\’EFm FRO.\[ I,VFR4STRCC~RE Page 23
infrastructure investment are much higher than in Table 2. This is partially a result of the higher
coefficient estimate for fiber (.11 vs .07), but also due to the addition of one more type of
infrastmcture, ISDN. me mean and median increase in demand is 13 percent, with considerable
range of experiences across the LECS (s.d. = .08).
These are large estimates. As a consequence, we can not reasonably argue that
investment in ISDN and fiber-optic cable by themselves were responsible for over ten percent of
revenue enhancement at all LECS. It is more likely that activity in a whole range of digital
technologies accompany investment in fiber and the totality of all this investment was demand
enhancing. Moreover, we cannot say how much demand enhancing investment was or was not
captured by the LEC due to regulated changes in prices. However, our estimates do appear
consistent with industry consensus that in the absence of LEC investment in new technologies,
revenues would have fallen in many localities.
We now discuss the implications of Table 5 for inferences about consumer welfare. In all
the estimates, the enhancement to consumer surplus from infrastructure investment is the same as
the demand elasticity, which is large. Thus, we conclude that a high percentage increase in
consumer surplus, as much as a ten percent or more, is due to recent investment in digital
infrastructure investment and the inves~ent activities correlated with it.
Since an estimate of the percentage surplus attributable to infrastructure is scale free, it is
difficult to interpret without any base estimate for total consumer surplus, which is not
recoverable in our model. For expository ease we translate our estimate of the elasticity of
consumer surplus to ifiastructure into its price-equivalent change. More specifically, for a
constant elasticity of demand -- that is, Q = Af(I)P= -- we calculate the extent to which prices
must have declined to provide the same consumer surplus change as provided by actual
infrastmcture investment, fixing I at its later value. If the estimated percentage increase in
consumer surplus due to ifiastructure investment is given by O/OdC, then the percentage price
decline that provides the same amount of consumer surplus is given by %dP = [1 - %dC] {l/[]<Jl-
1, where e >1 is the elasticity of demand.~z Since we do not know the value of the elasticity of
demand, we calculate %dP under different resumptions about demand elasticities (i.e., e = 1.5,2
or 2.5). This is sufficient for our purposes, which is to illustrate the degree of the welfare changes.~U:US[ 31.1996 J}’ELF.4 RE BE.YEFI~ FRO.lf I,VFR4~RCCX’RE Page ?4
implicit in the estimates.
These calculations are also in Table 5. Not surprisingly, as demand becomes more elastic
a smaller price decline achieves the equivalent amount of consumer surplus. At most LECS the
increase in consumer surplus is equivalent to a decline of prices on the order of 12 and 8 percent
if demand elasticities are 2.0 and 2.5. The median is smaller, 10 and 6 percent respectively. The
estimates from Table 5 lead to higher gains to consumers than the estimates from table 2. Once
again, looking at the conservative estimates that exclude SS7, we see that the price equivalent
declines are 15 and 10 percent if demand elasticities are 2.0 and 2.5. For the elasticity of 1.5 the
equivalent price declines are much larger, but are not shown.~; No matter how we calculate it,
these gains are equivalent to substantial price declines. Since these are conservative methods we
conclude that the welfare benefits from infiastmcture investment during the 1988-1992 period
were large.
3. Tile marginal retnrns from infrastrl[cture investment ,
Our model also provides insight into the diffusion of advanced digital infrastructure ,by
quantifying the LEC’S incentives to invest in more infrastructure. We can use our static model to
examine the marginal benefit to the LEC from more infrastructure. Under the Cobb-Douglas
specification dR/dI = (~)~QI, where we estimate ~Q[. A Similar calculation for tie translog also
can be done. While investments in sunk assets are not entirely a static problem for the LEC, this
“as if’ exercise still yields usefil insight into the incentives influencing the diffusion of digital
infrastmcture. This exercise only requires estimates of y and not cost estimates.
Table 6 presents the estimates for different values of the elasticity of demand with respect
to fiber. The first three estimates show different values for y that span the lower range of
infrastructure elasticity estimates found in tables 2 and 3. The last shows a comparison with the
translog estimates from Table 1 in the appendix. The table calculates the returns to one year’s
revenue from an additional “fiber-mile”, standardizing in 1987 dollars. The table only examines
the LECS owned by the Regional Bell Operating Companies, who did most of the investment in
fiber in the United States.
The table shows that for a low estimate of the el~ticity to infrmtructure by 1992 the~U:USt31. 1996 IVEI!F.4REBE,VEFI~ FRO.1[1.YFR45TRCCTCRE Page 25
median marginal return on another fiber mile was $662 in current revenue for our lowest
estimates of alpha. Even among the RBOCS there wm considerable variation in these returns.
The first quartile received $472 and third $835. The mean is slightly higher than the median,
showing a slightly skewed distribution. For the higher estimates of y, the same patterns holds
with all values increasing proportionately.
The Table shows a dramatic the change over the five year period. The median marginal
return falls rapidly over the period. By 1992 it is at one quarter its level of 1988. This pattern
does not depend on the estimate for y (partly due to the Cobb-Douglas assumption we use for
f(I)), The variation also declines sharply across all the LECS over the same period, again
irrespective of the estimate of y we use. This change largely reflects the reduction in the amount
of skewness in marginal returns. The LECS are becoming more alike over time.
In the bottom we present the same simulations using the most consemative translog
estimate (where the mean elasticity is 0.6 over the sample and growing slightly over time). The
results do not differ much from the Cobb-Douglas specification in their main qualitative features.
The marginal returns to infrastmcture fall dramatically over time and the range across firms also
falls, though the magnitudes do differ somewhat. Hence, we conclude that these patterns are not
a feature of the functional form we resume for the benefit function.
These estimates are consistent with a relatively straightfomard diffusion model. As the
user-costs of installing infrastmcture fell rapidly over the period, phone companies installed the
lower cost input deeper into their network, into places where its marginal return was lower. It is
reasonable to conjecture that the narrowing marginal returns are being driven by learning,
experience and knowledge spillovers. As all companies became fmiliar with the new
technology, the oppo~nities for investment necessarily narrowed be~een companies.
4. TJte ‘~riend[iness” of different states
The final interesting feature of the revenue estimates is associated with the political
variables. In our simple model of revenue, the factors associated with political factors measure
the state’s regulatory stringency. This stringency then influences prices and revenue, This line of
causation is distinct from economic and demographic factors, which influence both the political~UgUS[ 31.1996 11’ELF.4RE BE.VEFITSFRO.L[1.vFR4STRL’CWRE Page 16
motivation for setting a level of prices and the aggregate quantity demanded at a certain price
level.
The theoretical model suggests that we may break out the component of revenue
associated with the political factors in the state. Table 7 shows our implementation for 1988
1992.Using table 2, we compute the sum of the “political” coefficients multiplied times the
and
variables for each state.~g We then take the difference be~een this sum and the maximum for
that year, standardizing the “friendliest” state at zero. We determine the rank of the state in that
year by the average of the estimates from the two columns. We do this for all jurisdictions except
Nebraska and Washington D.C.’j For comparison, we also show the lMerrill-Lynch rankings for
regulatory friendliness towards electrical utilities, as used by Joskow, Rose and Wolfram [1996].
These estimates show large differences be~een states in the degree of friendliness. The
difference between the minimum and the maximum is as much as -.5 in some estimates, which
translates into over a 30% decline in revenues due to political variables. The mean is generally
around -.25, which translates into a 16°/0decline in revenue. These differences will have a large
influence on infiastmcture investment behavior and the returns to infrastmcture undei any,
investment model. Under the investment model proposed in (7b), for example, the effects of
regulatory friendliness would be quite pronounced.qb We conclude that this index is indirect
evidence that the regulatory environment has an important quantitative effect on company
investment in infrastmcture.
The Tables shows stability in the ranking of states over these five years. Most of the
changes reflect changes in the state political actors. The states that stay in the top fifieen in both
samples are Alabama, California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, South
Carolin~ and Utah. The states that stayed in the bottom fifteen in both years are Colorado,
Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota. No states
moved from the bottom to the top. The states that move from the top to bottom include North
Carolina and Oklahoma. This relative stability in state rankings, combined with the effect the
regulatory environment can have on investment -- as shown above -- is intriguing empirical
evidence for the commitment to regulatory policies by potentially changing political institutions.
As a related aside, we have generally found that in any given year our index does not correlate.Au:ust 31.1996 IVELF.4REBE.VEF~ FRO.\[ I,YFR4gR CCTL’RE Page 27
with the Merrill-Lynch index for electrical utilities.~’
These results, while admittingly a crude measure of regulatory friendliness, do suggest
the importance of political factors in shaping the environment in which firms invest. We suspect,
however, that we are reaching the natural limits of our reduced form approach to variation
befiveen political institutions. With more time-variation or perhaps more structure on the model
of regulatory mechanisms, Ner research may be able to identi~ the influence of political
actors and institutions with more precision.
5. Cost eq[latio~r estimates
Several different estimates of the investment equation were estimated. Appendix 2 and 3
contain the revenue and investment equations for the Cobb-Douglas specifications shown
previously. Appendix 2 estimates this only for fiber on the full sample. Appendix 3 shows
estimates for a multi-input specification using only fiber and ISDN, not SS7. SS7 was excluded
based on the results in Tables 3, which indicated that the elasticity on SS7 was rarely positive or .
non-zero. h investment equation was also added to the basic specification of the translog
benefit function. These are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Appendix 1 along with the other
translog estimates. Table 8 summarizes the main findings.
The firm dummies identi~ large differences in the costs of installing fiber. The results
are summarized in Table 8 where the coefficient estimates have been transformed into their
corresponding cost index values. ~ese indexes do not represent the full cost of installing
infrastructure, only the costs that are not otherwise accounted for by other variables, but vary
over time or across firms. We present a range of estimates, reflecting the extreme highs and lows
among the variety of specifications.
Table 8 does not indicate that the RBOCS (Regional Bell Operating Companies) have
much lower costs than the Contel, GTE or the independents. The firm dummies differ too much
across specifications to draw such a conclusion. However, among the RBOCS, Bell Atlantic,
Nynex and Pacific Bell all have lower costs for installing fiber than the remaining firms. The
degree of cost advantage, however, differs widely across specifications and samples. For ISDN,
the RBOCS have much lower costs than either GTE or Contel.~U~US[31. 1996 J!-ELF.4M BE,VEF~ FRO.11I,VFMSTRL’CTCRE Page 28
The time dummies, as expected, indicate a large secular decline in the cost of installing
fiber. Table 8 shows an 80% decline in costs over five years when the full sample is used, while
it shows over a 64°/0decline over four years from the partial sample. This accords with the
obsemed behavior and publicity about some of the large investment programs recently
undertaken by LECS. It is also consistent with the results in Table 6 showing a decline in
marginal revenue over time. In addition, Table 8 shows a decline in the costs of ISDN of over
85V0over four years, also consistent with the recent gain in momentum to difise ISDN to
business users.
Certainly the rapid fall in these estimates partly reflects that the true economic costs of
installing digital technologies, including the costs of material and construction, came down
dramatically in the late 80s, However, since the price of materials associated with fiber optic
cable and related technologies (such as repeaters) was not falling as rapidly over this time
penod,~s material prices alone cannot form the entire explanation. Thus, we conjecture that our
estimates reflect the joint workings of many secular factors that influence the costs of
installation, including, but not restricted to the cost of materials, like declines in the costs of
acquiring knowledge on how to install new technologies efficiently and quickly; experience in
solving installation problems; costs of training, and other factors that influence the user cost of
installation. Further, we suspect that this reflects a well-known feature of fiber in the local loop --
the first strands are the most dificult to lay along any given route, but once these initial costs are
sunk, additional fiber miles me much emier.
Despite these dramatic changes, secular declines in cost ue not the only factor at work
explaining heterogeneity on the cost side. Other implications about costs come directly from
appendix 2 and 3. In virtually every estimation the land and population variables are significant.
In fiber there are increasing costs in larger territories and decreasing costs in larger populations
(over the relevant ranges of the data). However, these scale effects eventually slow at very high
population levels or large terntones and definitely interact. ISDN shows weak diseconomies in
large population areas, though no sensitivity to geographic size.
The performance of the remaining cost variables is mixed. Overall the variables on
construction markets does not predict the costs of laying fiber except in appendix 2’s estimates.Au~u5t31, 1996 IVELF.4 M BE.YEFITS FRO.L[1.VFRJ5TRUCTURE Page 29
There, higher wages raise the cost of installation, as does recent growth in construction markets
(perhaps reflecting capacity constraints). Construction market variables also do not predict the
costs of installing ISDN. It is also interesting to note that the inherited experience from a high
stock of fiber in 1986 does seem to provide advantages across all the types of infrastmcture
investment. According to Appendix 2, it seems to lower the costs of installing fiber. According
to appendix 3, it does not seem to influence the costs of installing fiber, but it does lower the
costs of installing ISDN.
VI. Conclltsion
When economic policy focuses on information infrastructure, the presumption has been
that more is better. While this may be right to the first order, in this paper we claim that whether
it is right or not will only be known from detailed case studies.
In this study we examined investment in fiber optic cable, ISDN lines and signal seven
software, infrastmcture which plays an essential role in bringing digital technology to local
telephone networks. We chose to study local telephone service because these are an important set
of users and investors in the burgeoning “information super highway.” We estimated a model
composed of a regulator and an LEC, that allowed us to estimate the elasticity of final user
demand for infrastmcture investment by their LEC, controlling for factors such as local
economic activity and the political disposition of state regulators.
In all our estimates we find that consumer demand is sensitive to investment in modem
infrastmcture as represented by fiber optic cable. We find that, as of 1992, fiber-optic cable
enhances LEC demand. Sometimes our estimates show that ISDN lines do as well, but SS7
generally does not. The estimated elasticity of consumer surplus to fiber optic deployment is
never less than 6 percent and much higher in some estimates. me elasticity of demand for ISDN
ranges widely between zero and 16 percent. The elmticity for SS7 is rarely robustly estimated. In
all our estimates these magnitudes lead to the conclusion that infrastmcture investment is
responsible for a substantial fraction of the growth in consumer surplus and business revenue.
As far as local telephone markets are concerned, we see many research aspects to develop
further. We have subsumed the regulatory behavior into our reduced form estimates and not usedAU:USt31. 1996 }}’ELF.4ti BE.VEFITS FRO.111.YFR4STRUCTURE Page 30
reported information on the diffision of regulatory reforms and their adoption by state agencies.
Nor have we filly modeled the complex dynamic bargaining that goes on between state
regulators and LECS over infrastructure and pricing. Infrastructure expenses are (literally and
figuratively) sunk, while regulatory agencies might offer only weak commitments to LECS to
recover revenue on these investments. Finally, in this paper we have only characterized consumer
heterogeneity in a reduced form way. Providing more structure could help us identi& the
different effects of infrastmcture deployment on business and residential consumers, urban and
rural customers, etc. Separating these effects should help us identify the magnitude of the welfare
returns to consumers and producers from infrastructure investment, and sharpen the policy
implications.
Besides local telephone networks, many related information technology markets are
potential subjects for the study of the benefits associated with new digital technology. It is well
known that the long distance telephone companies and the competitive access providers have
made extensive investments in fiber optic cable and related digital technologies. It is also well
known that private fires are also making large investments in user-owned networks, which
combine computing and communication technology in user-customized arrangements. These
digital networks are both complementary and substitute to the public infrastmcture network,
further increasing the complexity of any welfare analysis. Only such careful studies will reveal
whether the results we found for local telephone markets hold for other modem digital
infrastructure in a wide array of markets.~U~U513 1.1996 JI’ELF.4RE BE.VEF~ FRO.lf i.\ ’FR-lSTRUC~RE Page 31
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ENDNOTES
1. There is a relatively developed literature on the influence of telecommunications
infrmtructure investment on developing and rural economies. This literature is usually
concerned, however, with the level of penetration rates and quality of basic service. See, for
example, Hardy [1980] or Saunders et al [1983]. Reviews of earlier work in telecommunication
are usually about modernizing the post-lWI US telephone system. See Mueller [1993] for a
“skeptical” review. Also see Roller and Waverman [1994] for a cross-country comparison closer
to our focus on modem telecommunications networks.
2. For a variety of perspectives on information infrastmcture policy see Commerce Department,
NTIA [1991], Kahin [1991], National Research Council [1995], Teske [1995], Williams [1991].
For tier discussion of policies associated with inducing telecommunications infrastructure
investment, see Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller [1995], Huber [1993], ‘Kraashaur [1995], Lehr
and Nell [1989], McMmter [1995], Selander [1990], Tardiff and Taylor [1993], Taylor, Zarkadas
and Zona [1993], or Yates [1990].
3. See Bresnahan [1987] for an analysis of the impact of computers on the financial services
industry; Hausman and Tardiff [1995] for an analysis of the demand for Voice Messaging
Services in telecommunications; Trajtenberg [1990] for an analysis of the returns to hospitals
from improvements in CT scanner technology; Hendel [1995] for an analysis of the benefits to
business users from improvements in PC technology; and, Brown and Greenstein [1995] for an
analysis of large computer system user benefits from technical change.
4. See Munell [1992] Aschauer [1990], Deiwart [1986] and Greenstein and Spiller [1995] for a
broader review of infrastmcture studies inside and outside of telecommunications.
5. DRI used an input/output approach to measure the contribution of telecommunication to
economic efficiency, in particular, improvements in sectoral total factor productivity. DRI
estimates that there wm a $46.5 billion dollar resource saving (in 1990 dollars) due to increased
efficiency in the supply of telecommunications equipment and semice (see Cronin et al [1993a,
1993b]). They find that about 25V0of productivity growth over the late 1970s to 1990s was
attributable to improvements in telecommunications productivity and consumption efficiencies.
These effects are especially pronounced in finance, transportation, trade, real estate and
petroleum refining. Cronin et al [1993a] perform a similar analysis for a more disaggregate
sample, a cross section of counties in Pennsylvania, and confirm the findings made with more
aggregate data.
6. Dholakia and Harlam [1994] examine variation in telecommunications quality across the 50
states. They find a positive relationship between investment in telecommunications and
economic activity, controlling for other factors such as state education, energy consumption, and
other inputs to the local economy. In a predecessor to this paper’s study, Greenstein and Spiller
[1995], using the same unit of analysis as in this paper, examine the influence of
telecommunications infrastmcture on local economic activity in nvo sectors, finance, insurance~U:US[ 31.1996 J1’ELF.4RE BE.YEFIn FRO.1[l,h”FR4STR UCTURE Page 35
and real-estate (FIRE) and manufacturing. They find that modem infrastructure is associated with
large increases in FIRE, but not manufacturing. Their interpretation is that administrative activity
tends to use the public network intensively while manufacturing does not.
7.The increase in price sensitivity may arise from two complementary effects: Increases in
infrastmcture brings to the network users who are more price sensitive. Second, increases in
infrastmcture brings about higher volume uses of the network, making the demand more elastic
overall. Both occur when the installation of digital infrmtructure enables new services, or when
modem infrastmcture permits the trmsmission of data with greater speed and reliability,
inducing higher volumes of traffic.
8. For reasons explained below, short of directly estimating demand functions, this assumption
is needed to be able to estimate the aggregate effect of infrastructure deployment at the LEC
level.
9. Comparing consumer surplus growth to last period’s levels rather than first period’s levels is a
more consewative measure, particularly when infrastructure is growing rapidly.
10. Notice that this is not a profit calculation, as we have not considered installation costs.
11. As noted below in several footnotes, most of our inferences are robust to the assumption
about the minor effect on operating expenses. Relaxing the assumption, however, unnecessarily
complicates the exposition of the model and adds little additional insight.
12. Note that if operating expenses are reduced in proportion to investment then these additional
savings will be equivalent to a lower per-unit cost of infrastructure, i.e., a lower W.
13. Notice hat ~~p,the negative of the elasticity of demand, must be positive by definition.
Hence, 0 must be greater than 1 in equilibrium.
14. Our estimation strategy for learning the degree of revenue enhancement due to infrastmcture
investment would be unaltered even if infrastructure lowers operating expenses. That is, if
equation (3) were modified to include an additional term related to operating expenses, we would
still end up with a bmic relationship in the form found in (4).
15,If P were functions of I, then we would not be able to perform the move from (4a) to (4b), and
hence, y would not be identifiable from (4d).
16.We could only identifi price elmticities from (4) under the strong restriction that XLis not an
underlying determinant of political objectives, 6, which seems implausible.
17.This restriction becomes difficult to satisfy with more complex specifications of the benefit
function (e.g., such as translog or multiple inputs).~U:USI31. 1996 IVELF.4REBE,YEFIZ FRO.11I.VFRASTRCCWRE Page 36
18.Sorne infrastructure variables in a few LECS violate this msurnption, particularly in the early
years of the data. Thus, we add one unit of fiber to all LECS fiber levels.
19. We assume a firm that ma..imizes the present value of profits, while regulators area
succession of individuals with a one period horizon. For analyses of the implications of
multiperiod firms being regulated by single period regulators, see Lewis andSappington(1991 ).
See also Spiller and Urbiztondo (1994) for analyses of the endogeneity of regulators’ horizons.
20. The complexity of the translog estimation, and the requirement to impose positive
elasticities, would make such an extension extremely complex. As we found with this study’s
data, the additional complexity of the translog for a single input generated little additional
insight.
~1.OnlY comp~ies that em over $1()(1million in revenue are required to report to the FCC.
22.GMS collected all forty eight state maps from the states’ regulatory commissions and main
telephone companies.
23 .Although it is often the case that more than one carrier is operating in a county, over the entire
state these discrepancies tend to average out, thus eliminating any major biases.
24. Though GTE and Contel merge during 1991, we continue to treat them as separate
obsemations every year in our sample.
25. Fiber optic cable enables high volume traffic and is widely considered to be an essential part
of the modem digital telephone system. Fiber optic cable is a high speed, high quality
transmission mechanism that is limited in capacity only by the available terminal and repeater
technology. It is purified silica glass using laser chips. Erbiurn-doped fiber amplifiers enhance
the capacity to tens of thousands of gigabit-kilometers per second. Further digital technologies,
deployed in conjunction with fiber, enable a variety of new services and more reliable as well as
higher quality data senices over phone lines. We measure the deployment fiber in “fiber-miles”,
which is the equivalent of a strand of fiber laid over one mile (For further discussion, see
Kraashaur [1995]). In practice, many strands are laid over the same routes, so one thousand miles
of fiber optic cable does not cover one thousand geographic miles. This should be thought of as a
measure of the carrying capacity along communication lines. The typical patterns of deplo yment
at an LEC occurred first beween “feeder plants”, i.e., between central office and a business or a
remote terminal, where the volume of use is largest. Even as late as 1992, very little had yet been
deployed directly to residences,
26. Integrated Services Digital Nelsvork, ISDN, involves installing lines and switches using a
series of technical specifications designed to eme the movement of data traffic between two
points over telephone lines. At its simple technical level ISDN is an international standard that
allows voice, data, text, and video communications to travel simultaneously down the same
transmission path. More practically, its use will be facilitated by the implementation of other~U:USI31. 1996 1}’ELF.)RE BE.\’EF~ FRO.\f li\rFRASTRUCXRE Page 37
digital technology and the adoption of SS7. It is an engineering concept that contemplates a
public, end-to-end switched digital network in which time division switches and digital
transmission paths accommodate multiple services originating at subscriber locations. While
ISDN has been proposed for many years, its diffusion within the United States did not accelerate
until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even then, there were large differences across LECS due to
widely-reported inter-company differences in efficiencies, regulatory-imposed rules on prices for
installation and service, and regional differences in the demographics of local demand.
27. SS7 is a type of software for routing calls and data. It uses the existing backbone and switch
network more efficiently, allowing greater use of the telephone network for data traffic. At a
technical level, Signaling System 7 (SS7) is an CCITT standard for out-of-band signaling that
conforms to ISDN standard specifications. More to the point, it is software that facilitates the
use of ISDN, creating two channels within a single line. This improves the efficiency of a
network because less capacity is tied up in the process of comecting a call.
28. The changes are due primarily to the treatment of revenue from cellular services.
29.This data field produces a slightly unbalanced panel among some small independent
operators, but is complete for the RBOCS and for GTE.
30. Our other demographic data, while covering extremely diverse geographic/economic areas
across the entire US, measure cross sectional differences with country-level averages, so we
cmot easily construct this variable directly from BEA statistics.
31. In practice, this tends to primarily identifi LECS that cover sprawling suburb-oriented sun-
belt communities, which were the fastest growing areas in the 1980s.
32. DC also has a mayor, not a governor. Nebraska state politicians do not need to declare their
political affiliations. These features make their political situation not easily comparable.
33. Due to the presence of independent regulators in a few regulatory agencies in a few years, a
non-majority of democrats does not necessarily imply a majority of republicans. We tried
standardizing on either party and found that it did not influence our inferences.
34. In this data set, this is about the most one can identi~ about political alignment. The
alignment of governor and legislature occurs virtually at the same time as alignment with the
regulatory agency. Similarly, the alignment of the legislature and the regulator occurs virtually
always with aligrunent with the governor. For further discussion of these issues, see Greenstein,
Sosa and Spiller [1996].
35. The range of estimates are computed over all years over the entire sample, including
Washington DC and Nebraska. Since the amount of fiber grows over time, so too does the
elasticity, but not greatly since the coefficient is so small.~U:USI31. 1996 IVELFAM BE,Y-EF~ FRO.\l I.VFRISTRCCTL!RE Page 38
36. These are available for the authors on request. In general, only the coefficients on fiber
yielded consistently positive itiastructure elasticities.
37. The high FIRE states include W, CA, CT, DE, FL, IL, MA, NJ and NY.
38. The sign on democratic governor is always negative and the coefficient on republican
legislature is always lower than the coefficient on democratic legislature (and sometimes
significant). Also, phone companies seem to be worse off when all the legislature and the
governor are aligned instead of split (sometimes this is also significant).
39. In other words, we calculate [f(12) - f(I 1)] / [f(12)], where fo is given to us by our elasticity
estimates and 11 and 12 is given to us by actual investment by LECS at different time periods.
Period one is either 1988 or 1989, depending on the sample, and period two is 1992.
40. This is partly because we can include Nebraska and Washington DC in the welfare
calculations, but also because we do not need to exclude observations due to the absence of
revenue data, as was necessary for the estimation.
41. For the same reasons described in the previous footnote.
42. If the elmticity of demand is constant, then the percentage of consumer surplus attributable to
1=) which leads to the fomula stated in the text. a recent decrease in price is 1 - (P1/Pz)( ,
43. Some of the simulations using 1.5 price elasticity stretch the realm of credibility since it is
difficult to imagine that the elasticity of demand will stay constant for very large changes in
prices.
44. This list includes eve@ing in the category of S. The results were not especially sensitive to
the set of two-stage estimates we used. We did not use the estimates with LEC dummies because
these dummies will also partly reflect political expectations.
45. As noted, both are excluded due to their unusual political institutions. It is interesting to note,
however, that if we treat Nebraska as a “unified Republican legislature and governor” and
compare it with other states, it generally rises to the near the top in our friendliness measure. This
is consistent with perception that the state government goes to g-rest lengths to encourage the
telemarketing industry within the state.
46. Combining the estimates of y from (4d) with (7c) yields an equilibrium sensitivity of
infrastructure to political friendliness (PF) as follows: d(log(I”))/d(PF) = PF/( 1-y), where PF
equals the estimates of&S horn equation (7c). For example, for y = 0.1, d(log(I”))/d(PF) =
1.15;S. For a political friendliness index of -0.25, this derivative is -0.28.
47. Note that in the M-L index, a lower number is friendlier, while in our index a higher number
is fiendlier. Hence, if they were to provide the same measure they \vould be negative correlated.~U=US[31. 1996 11’ELF,4RE BE.VEFIn FRO.L!I,VFRrlSTRUCTURE Pase 39
48. We thank Edwin Dean and Henry Guyot of the BLS for tracking dow these price series for
us and bringing this to our attention.TABLE 1
DESC RIPTIVE STATISTICS
EN DOGENOUS AND EXOGEN OUS VARIABLES
H wm w m m
~ VAR ABL
LOG ALLREVENUE 12.75 1.42 7.25 15.86 5838.40 458
LOG LOCALREVENUE 11.88 1.64 6.09 15.16 3658.46 S08
LOG(I+FIBER),FULLSMPL 9.?4 2.09 0.00 13.02 4276.78 458
LOG (l+FIBER), PARTIALSMPL 9.73 2.00 0.00 13.02 2996.11 308
LOG (l+ISDN) 3.12 2.68 0.00 8.10 961.74 308
LOG (1+SS7) 2.36 2.28 0.00 6.58 727.77 308
LO CAL DEMOG RAPHICS
FR4C URBANIZED 0.46 0.28 0.00 0.94 208.95 458
FR4C RUWL 0.37 0.20 0.02 0.86 167.71 458
LOG POPULATION 7.02 1.40 2.81 10.17 3216.82 458
LOG PERCAPITA NCOME 9.60 0.16 9,13 10.03 4395.92 458
3MALL (ST EMPLOYMENT < 10VO 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 124.00 458
LOG POPULATION DENS 4.52 1.19 1.58 7.11 2072.00 458
LOG LAND AREA 9.41 1.21 5.67 11.47 4308.57 458
:ITY OF QUARTER MILLION 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 180.00 458
:ITY OF HALF MILLION 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 85.00 458
FAST GROWING AREA 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 75.00 458
LOG CONSTRUCTION WAGES ~.;~ 0.15 2.06 2.69 1069.33 458
LOG CONSTRUCTION EMPLOY 10.34 1.45 5.59 13.54 4736.92 45s
CONSTRUCTION GROWTH 0.21 9.83 -31.41 101.99
LOG (l+FIBER) IN 1986
94.48 , 45S
4.83 3.26 0.00 10.83 2213.22 458
NDEPENDENT 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 73.00 458
GTE 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 130.00 458
kMEIUTECH 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 25.00 458
3ELL ATLANTIC 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 30.00 458
3ELL SOUTH 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 45.00 458
~YNEX 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 30.00 458
‘ACIFIC BELL 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 10.00 458
jOUTH~STERN BELL 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 25.00 458
JSWEST 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 65.00 458
.
>TATEDEMOGRA PHICS
jTATE GNP GROWTH 1.33 2.;0 -7.77 9.62 611.15 458
.OG STATE/LOC PCAPINC 0.04 0.10 -0.16 0.40 16.80 458
‘WC ST GNP N FIRE 0,07 0.01 0.05 0.12 32.63 458
~
:OMMISSION NOT ELECT 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 315.00 458
IEMOCRAT COMM ~JORI~ 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 299.00 458
{OT EL & DEM COMM MAJ 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 193.00 459
;TATE VOTE DUKAKIS 0.45 0.05 0.34 0.56 207.63 458
30 VERNOR DEMOCRAT 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 248.00 458
WPUBLICAN LEGISLATURE 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 48.00 458
)EMOCF!AT LEGISLATURE 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 290.00 458
4LIGN REG, GOV 0.80 0.40 0.00 I.00 368.00 458
JLIGN REG, GOV AND LEGIST ().29 0.45 0.00 I.00 131.00 458TABLE 2
FULL SAMPLE. 458 OBSERVATIONS. 1988-1992
FIBER ONLY
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PARTIAL SAMPLE. 3090 BSERVATIONS, 1989-1992
FIBER. ISDN. SS7
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POINT ESTIMATES OF INFRAS TRUCTURE ELASTICITIES
TWO STAGE LEAST SOU ARES ESTIMATES
COBB-DOUGLASS
iNO LEC DUMMIES FIBER ISDN SS7
FIBER ONLY, FULL SAMPLE ALL REVENUE
LOCAL REVENUE







FIBER ONLY, FULL SAMPLE ALL REVENUE
LOCAL REVENUE







NO LEC DUMMIES FIBER



















ESTIMA TED GAINS FROM INFRASTRUC TURE
m ~V ~EDtAN
FIBER : GAMM A =0.07
PERCENT DUE TO ~FRASTRUCTURE 0.10 0.08 0.09
EQUIVALENT % PRICE DECL~E, e = 2.0 0.12 0.12 0.10
EQUIVALENT % PRICE DECLINE, e = 2.5 0.08 0.07 0.06
FIBER. ISDN: GAMivIA = {0.11. 0.02}
PERCENT DUE TO ~FRASTRUCTURE 0.13 0.08 0.13
EQUIVALENT % PRICE DECL~E, e = 2.0 0.16 0.08 0.15
EQUIVALENT % PRICE DECLINE, e = 2.5 0.10 0.Oj 0.10TABLE 6
M~ RGINAL VEN F A FIBER
REG IONAL BELL OP ERATING CO MPANIE~
J98 8-1992
1988 19s9 1990 1991 1992
GAMMA = 0.7
AVER4GE 9376.9 2358.6 1546.4 1032.9 706.4
STANDARD DEVIATION 31133.4 1371.3 700.3 412.9 ;44.9
FIRST QUARTILE 2051.1 1578.9 1067.5 768.S 472.7
MEDIAN 2762.6 20?2.4 1370.4 930.9 662.0
THIRD QUARTILE 3885.5 2581.8 1775.9 1227.3 835.9
GAMMA =0.1 1
AVER4GE 14735.1 3706.3 2430.1 1623.1 1110.1
STANDARD DEVIATION 48923.9 2154.9 1100.5 648.9 542.1
FIRST QUARTILE 3223.1 2481.1 1677.5 1208.0 742.7
MEDIAN 4341.3 2193.7 2153.5 1462.8 1040.3
THIRD QUARTILE 6105.7 4057.1 2790.6 1928.6 1313.6
GAMMA = 0.14
AVERAGE I 18753.7 4717.1 3092.8 2065.8 1412.8
STANDARD DEVIATION 62266.7 2742.6 1400.6 825.8 689.9
FIRST QUARTILE 4102.2 3157.8 2135.0 1537.5 945.3
MEDIAN 5525.5 4064.7 2740.8 1861.8 1324,0
rHIRD QUARTILE 7770.9 5163.5 3551.7 2454.6 1671.8
rR4NSLOG, MEAN(GAW) = 0.06
4VERAGE 7011.7 2079.8 1409.4 968.2 687.6
STANDARD DEVIATION 20803.5 1003.3 550.6 366.6 298.5
FIRST QUARTILE 1922.8 1446.7 1011.2 744.1 489,1
WEDIAN 2466.4 1816.3 1340.6 913.9 650.1
rHIRD OUARTILE 3187.8 2428.6 1615,S 1064.4 786.7TABLE 7












































































































































































































































































































































COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED COST INDICES
APPENDIX 2 APPENDIX 3 APPENDIX 3
INPUT FIBER FIBER ISDN
REVENUE ALL LOCAL ALL LOCAL ALL LOCAL
CONTEL 1.00 1,00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
GTE 1.37 1.58 1.42 1.61 0.61 0.65
NDEPENDENT 2.13 2.39 3.18 3.49 0.66 0.63
AMERITECH 0.92 1.45 0.69 1.10 0.08 0.12
BELL ATLANTIC 0.62 0.86 0.44 0.64 0.03 0.04
BELL SOUTH 1.14 1.75 0.63 0.99 0.16 o.~~
NYNEX 0.58 0.76 0.50 0.67 (),12 0.26
PACIFIC BELL 0.47 0.61 0.43 0.62 0.15 0.19
30 UTHWESTE~ BELL 0.90 1.31 0.66 0.96 0.15 (),~o
USWEST 0.72 1.09 0.45 0.68 0.06 0.08
1988 1.00
1989 0.55 1.00 1.00
I990 0.35 0.67 0.39
1991 0.27 0.48 o.~1
I992 0.19 0.35 0.13APPENDIX 1
F ~z B VATIONS. 1988-1
FIBER ONLY
TWO AND THREE STAG E LEAST SOUA RES
COBB-DOUGLAS. TRANSLOG SPEC IFICATION
——..—..- .——— -- .—----
R v ~ TIO
TYPE OF REVENUE u ~ & ~
SPECIFICATION NO LEC DU~lNllES NO LEC DUNINIIES ~ WI L ~s
rYPE OF NIODEL TWO STAGE TWO STAGE ~ ~
~ SERR ~ - H-T m= I m-I
GAMMA ON FIBER 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *
GAklMA2 ON FIBER 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 * 0.01 0.00 ** 0.01 0.00 ‘*
POLI TIC.AL VARIABLES
COMMISSION NOT ELECT 0.36 0.09 ** 0.50 0.10 ** 0.29 0.08 ** 0.35 0.08 ‘+
DEM COMM MAJORITY 0.30 0.11 ** 0.50 0.12 ** 0.21 0.09 ** 0.32 0.09 **
NOT EL& DEM COMM MAJ -0.31 0.11 ** -0.46 0.12 ** -0.27 0.09 ** -0.34 0.10 **
STATE VOTE DUKAKIS -2.12 0.54 ** -2.13 0.58 ** -1.78 0.47 ** -1.65 0.49 **
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNOR -0.07 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.07
ALL LEG DEM 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.06
ALL LEG REP -0.10 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.08 0.08 -0.10 0.08
ALIGN GOV, REG, LEG -0.13 0.07 * -0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.06 -0.06 0.07
ALL REG, GOV 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.06 0:03 0.07
STATE DEMOG RAPHICS
STATE GNP GROWTH 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 ‘ 0.01
LOG STATE/’LOC PCAP~C -2.07 0.49 ** -3.03 0.53 ** -1.69 0.43 ** -2.24 0.45 **
FRAC ST GNP ~ FIRE 9.91 2.87 ** 13.06 3.11 ** 6.70 2.49 ** 8.03 2.58 **’
LOC AL DEMOG RAPHICS
FR4C URBANIZED 1.02 0.25 ** 1.30 0.28 ** 1.11 0.24 ** 1.34 0.25 **
FRAC RUR4L 1.63 0.33 ** 1.82 0.35 ** 1.89 0.29 ** 2.02 0.31 **
LOG POPULATION 0.68 0.06 ** 0.62 0.06 ** 0.67 0.06 ** 0.58 0.06 **
LOG PERCAPITA ~COME 0.06 0.30 -0.57 0.32 * 0.54 0.27 ** 0.04 0.29
LOG POPULATION DENS -0.08 0.03 ** -0.05 0.04 -0.09 0.03 ** -0.06 0.03 *
5~LL (FR4C ST EMP <1 o~o) 0.20 0.08 ** 0.15 0.08 * 0.21 0.06 ** 0.16 0.07 **
3UMMY 89 -0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.08 -0.11 0.07 -0.13 0.07 *
3UMMY 90 -0.14 0.08 * -0.11 0.09 -0.21 0.08 ** -0,22 0,08 **
3UMMY91 -o.~ 1 0.10 ** -0.16 0.10 -0.30 0.09 ** -0.31 0.10
>UMMY 92 -0.26 0.11 ** -0.19 0.12 -0.35 0.10 ** -0.37 0.11 **
DIN OF QUARTER MIL 0.44 0.08 ** 0.53 0.08 ** 0.;6 0.06 ** 0.40 0.07 **
CITY OF HALF MIL 0.20 0.07 ** o.~g 0.08 ** 0.16 0.06 ** 0.2? 0.07 **
?ASTGROW -0.09 0.08 -0.26 0.08 ** -0.09 0.07 -(),2() 0.07 **
20NSTANT, REV EQ 5.93 2.75 ** 10.46 2.99 ** 1.43 2.50 4,94 2.64 *APPENDIX 1
~ F -1992
F~ Y
TWO AND THREE STAGE J,EAST SC)UARES
c~ B T PECI ICATION
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{0 LEC DUMNIIES NO LEC DUMMIES







































































-1.25 0.09 **APPENDIX 2
FUL P ~ 988-1992
FIBER ONLY
THREE STAGE LEAST SOU ES AR
. . . .. . ...- . . . . .-. -.,
TYPE OF REVENUE & LOCAJ , m LOCAL
SPECIFICATION NO LEC DUFI~IIES ~ }VlLEC DU~IMIEs \Vl LEC DUNINIIES
~ S.ERR ~ ~ S.ERR ~ ~ $.ERR ~ ~ $. ERR ~
GAMMA ON FIBER 0.07 0.04 ** 0.11 0.04 ““ 0.10 0.05 * 0.11 0.05 *
POLITICAL VARIABLES
COMMISSION NOT ELECT 0.35 0.09 *“ 0.48 0.10 ** 0.41 0.09 ‘“ 0.55 0.10 **
DEM COMM MAJORITY 0.28 0.10 ** 0.45 0.11 ** 0.33 0.10 ** 0.50 0.11 **
NOT EL & DEM COMM MAJ -0.32 0.10 ** -0.46 0.11 ** -0.38 0.10 ** -0.51 0.11 **
STATE VOTE DUKAKIS -2.16 o,j~ ** -~.~o 0.56 ** -~.lo 0.60 ““ -~o~ 0.65 **
DEMOCWTIC GOVERNOR -0.06 0.07 -0.07 0.08 -0.06 0.07 -0,08 0.08
ALL LEG DEM 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.07 * 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.07 *
ALL LEG REP -0.09 0.09 -0.10 0.10 -0.10 0.09 -0.11 0.10
ALIGN GOV, REG, LEG -0.11 0.07 -0.07 0.08 -0,12 0.07 * -0.10 0.08
ALL REG, GOV 0,02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0,07
s~ RAP I
STATE GNP GROWTH 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
LOG STATE/’LOC PCAP~C -1.23 0.45 ** -3.27 0.49 ** -1.99 0.52 ** -2,43 0.56 **
FRAC ST GNP ~ FIRE 10.39 1.73 ** 13.63 2.95 ** 8.78 2.82 ** 11.72 3.06 **
~ AL DEM APHICS
FRAC URBANIZED 0.92 0.24 ** 1.11 0.26 ** 0.94 0.25 ** 1.09 0.27 **
FRAC RUUL 1.69 0.29 ** 1.91 0.31 ** 1.53 0.29 ** 1.72 ‘0.31 **
LOG POPULATION 0.71 0,05 ** 0.67 0.05 ** 0.70 0.06 ** 0.66 0.07 **
LOG PERCAPITA ~COME 0.26 0.29 -().~o 0.31 0.04 0.33 -0.39 0.35
LOG POPULATION DENS -0.09 0.03 ** -0.06 0.03 * -0.10 0.04 ** -0.03 0.04
SMALL (FRAC ST EMP < 10YO) 0.21 0.07 ** 0.16 0.08 ** 0.19 0.08 ** 0.16 0.08 *
DUMMY 89 -0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.07 -0.04 0.08
DUMMY 90 -0.13 0.08 * -0.08 0.08 -0.13 0.08 * -0.06 0.09
DUMMY 91 -0.19 0.09 ** -0.13 0.09 -0.19 0.09 ** -0.10 0.10
DUMMY 92 -1).~1 0.09 ** -0.11 0.10 -0.24 0.10 ** -0.1 I 0.11
CI~ OF QUARTER MIL 0.46 0.07 ** 0.57 0.07 ** 0.49 0.07 ** 0.56 0.07 **
CI~ OF HALF MIL 0.23 0.07 ** 0.34 0.07 ** 0.22 0.08 ** 0.39 0.08 **
FASTGROW -0.11 0.07 -0.26 0.08 ** -0.16 0.08 ** -0.30 0.08 **
CONSTANT, REV EQ 3.82 2.57 6.55 2.7S ** 5.89 2.93 ** 8.04
GTE
3.19 **
0.01 0.12 0.15 0.13
NDEPENDENT o.~~ 0.13 * 0.40 0.14 **
4MERITECH -0.24 0.18 0.08 0.19
BELL ATLANTIC 0.06 0.15 0.31 0.17 *
BELL SOUTH 0.02 0.16 0.40 0.17 **
NYNEX (),21 0.15 0.50 0.16 **
PACIFIC BELL 0.05 o.~() 0,50 0.22 **
SOUTHWESTERN BELL 0.09 0.16 0.51 0.18 **
USWEST 0.02 0.16 0.39 0.17 **APPENDIX 2
FULLSAME’ LE. 4580 BSERVATIONS, 1988.199~
FIBER ONLY
T~S T R
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iO LEC DUMN1lES NO l,EC DUhIfi[IEs WI LEC DUfil~lIES W/ LEC DUNINIIES
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TYPE OF REVENUE U ~ ~
SPECIFICATION N ~ NO LEC DUM MIES \Vl LEC DUMN[lE.S WI LEC DUNINIIE~
HUT msMT =-I H-I
GAiMMA ON FIBER o.~8 0.19 0.11 0.04 ** 0.42 0.06 ** 0.19 0.05 **
GAMMA ON ISDN 0.00 2,45 0.03 0.03 0.44 0.06 ** 0.19 0.05 **
~
COMMISSION NOT ELECT 0.41 0.30 0.47 0.11 ** 0.30 0.09 ** 0.39 0.10 **
DEM COMM MAJORITY 0.4s 0.3: 0.56 0.12 ** 0.37 0.10 ** 0,50 0.10 **
NOT EL& DEM COMM MAJ -0.38 0.34 -0.43 0.13 ** -0.34 0.10 ** -0.39 0.11 **
STATE VOTE DUKAKIS .~.11 1.53 .~.17 0.58 ** -1.68 0.57 ** -1.63 0.60 **
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNOR -0.04 0.20 -0.03 0.08 -0.0 I 0.06 -0.02 0.06
ALL LEG DEM -0.01 021 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.07
ALL LEG REP -0.10 0.26 -0.10 0.10 -0.08 0.08 -0.09 0.08
ALIGN GOV, R.EG, LEG -0.12 o.~ 1 -0.05 0.08 -0.11 0,06 * -0.07 0.07
ALL REG, GOV 0.00 0.21 -0.08 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.o1 0.07
STATE DEM OGRAPHICS
STATE GNP GROWTH -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
LOG STATE/LOC PCAPINC -2,78 1.56 * -3.67 0.59 ** -1.55 0.50 ** -2.37 0.54 **
FRAC ST GNP ~ FIRE 3.13 9.21 5.01 3.50 -0.18 ~,90 4.41 3.09
L A DE ~s
FR4C URBANIZED 1,27 0.77 * 1.08 0.30 ** 1.25 0.28 ** 1.35 0.30 **
FRAC RUWL 1.40 0.89 1.28 0.34 ** 1.34 0.31 ** 1.51 0.33 **
:OG POPULATION 0.85 0.16 ** 0.83 0.06 ** 0.72 0.07 ** 0.72 0.07 **
:OG PERCAPITA INCOME 0.21 0.87 -0.02 0.3: 0.19 0.34 -0.19 0.36
-OG POPULATION DENS -0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.04 * -0.19 0.04 ** -0.14 0.04 “*
SMALL (FR4C ST EMP < 10VO) 0.60 0.27 ** 0,56 0.10 ** 0.4? 0.09 ** 0.47 0.10 **
3UMMY 90 -0.05 0.18 -0.05 0.07 -().27 0.07 ** -0.22 0.08 **~
3UMMY91 -0.12 0.20 -0.14 0.0s * -0.46 0.10 ** -0.40 0.10 **
IUMMY 92 -0.15 0.25 -0.12 0.10 -0.66 0,13 ** -0.55 0.14 **
UIIY OF QUARTER MIL 0.18 0.25 0.20 0.09 ** 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
UITY OF HALF MIL -0.02 o.~ 1 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 I
?ASTGROW -0.07 0.21 -0.15 0.08 * -0.12 0.08 -0.23 0.08 **
DONSTANT, REV EQ 3.6? 7.87 4.53 3.03 4.3? 3.15 5.77 3.?4 *
3TE 0.12 0.11 0.29 0.12 **
NDEPENDENT 0,84 1).~; ** 1.06 0.24 **
4MERITECH -0,61 0.22 “* -0.19 o.~~
3ELL ATLANTIC -0.67 0.24 ** -0.41 0.25 *
3ELL SOUTH -0.52 0.19 ** -0.12 o,~()
~YNEX -0.12 0.18 0.19 0.19
‘ACIFIC BELL -0.53 0.20 ** -0.13 0.22
;OUTH~STERN BELL -0.34 0.18 * 0.08 0.19
JSWEST -0.66 0.21 ** -0.30 0.22APPENDIX 3
PARTIAL SA MPLE. 3090 BSERVATIONS. 1988-1992
~



























-1.17 0.60 * -1.19
0.?4 0.04 ** 0.24
1.25 0.65 * 1.13
0.04 0.05 0.03
.o~6 0,07 ** -0.23
0.25 0.31 0.48
1.16 0.59 * 1.25
-0.37 0.40 0.10
-0.83 0.38 ** -0.45
-0.47 0,41 -0.01
-0.70 0.36 ** -0.41
-0.84 0.51 * -0.48
-0.41 0.41 -0.04
-0.80 0.37 ** -0.39
0.03 0.04 0.02
-0.39 0.16 ** -0.36
-0.74 0.17 ** -0.69






















































































LOG (l+FIBER) lN 19S6
DUMMY 90
DUMMY 91
DUMMY 92
-4.54
-0.63
-0.24
0.01
1.71
-0.07
1.44
-0.06
-0.02
-0.42
-0.17
.~.j6
-3.49
-1.92
-1.46
-1.87
-1.84
-2.82
-0.16
-0.94
-1.56
.~.o~
16.93
0.59
0.34
0.01
0.60 *
0.04 *
0.65 *
0,05
0.07
0.31
0.59
0.40 *
0.38 *
0.41 *
0.36 *
0.51 *’
0.41 *
0.37 *’
0.04 *’
0.16 *’
0.17 *;
0.17 *’
0.62
-0.72
-0.30
0.01
1.53
-0.09
0.98
-0.06
0.04
-0.40
-0.38
-2.04
-3.04
-1.42
-1.30
-1.59
-1.59
-2.44
-0.18
-0.91
-1.51
-1.93
4.37 8.58
0.75 -o~4
0.43 -o,~~
0.01 0.00
0.76 ** 0.88
0.05 * -0.14
0.82 0.10
0.06 -0.04
0.09 0.16
0.39 -0.37
0.75 0.10
0.50 ** -2.26
0.48 ** -3.11
0.52 ** -1.73
0.45 ** -1.23
0.65 ** -2.06
0.52 ** -1.91
0.47 ** -2.82
0.05 ** -0.17
0.21 ** -0.94
0.22 ** -1.58
0.22 ** -2.00
;.87 **
0.72
0.39
0.01
0.69
0.05 *“
0.75
0.06
0.08 **
0.39
0.74
0.49 **
0.48 **
0.51 **
0.45 **
0.64 **
0.51 **
0.46 **
0.05 **
0.21 **
0.21 **
0.21 **
w
tV/LEC DI_Jll~[IEs
-0.35
-0.30
0,01
1.09
-0.14
0.15
-0.05
0,15
-0.19
0.34
-1.82
-2.77
-’1.26
-b.88
-1.65
-1.45
-2.38
-0.17
-0.91
-1.52
-1.93
0.73
0.40
0.01
0.70
0.05 **
0.77
0.06
0.08 *
0.40
0.76
0.50 “
0.4s **
o,52 *+
0.46 *
o,65 *A
0,52 **
0,47 **
0.05 **
0.21 **
o,~~ **
0.22 **
.